a. Reasons for the First Opinion

100. Argument for the first opinion is as follows:

[First reason] - As is the case in natural things, one should not posit more than natural reason proves necessarily, for more is superfluous (as is plain from Physics 1.4.188a17-18 and other places in the Philosopher [as Physics 6.189a15-16, 8.6.259a8-9]). So in matters of faith one should not posit more than can be proved from the truth of the matters of faith. But the truth of the Eucharist can be saved without transubstantiation;     therefore etc     .

101. The proof of the minor is that what is required for the truth of the Eucharist is a sign and a thing really contained signified by it; the substance of bread with its accidents can as well be the sign as the accidents alone can, indeed more so because the substance of bread under the species is nutriment more than the accidents are; therefore it is more representative of the body of Christ as to the idea of spiritual nutriment. Now the thing contained, namely the body of Christ, can be as well saved with the substance of the bread as with the accidents, because it is not more repugnant for a substance to be together with a substance than to be with a quantity of that substance.

102. And a confirmation of the above reason [n.100] is that one should, as far as possible, always posit fewer miracles; but by positing that the bread remains with its accidents, and that the body of Christ is really there, posits fewer miracles than positing that the bread is not there; for in the former case no accident would be posited without a substance.

103. [Second reason] - The second reason is as follows, and it more or less returns to the same: in matters of belief handed on to us according to universal understanding, it seems that a way of understanding should not be determined which is more difficult to understand and on which many unacceptable results seem to follow. But that the body of Christ is in the Eucharist is a truth thus universally handed on to us, and the understanding that no substance of bread is there seems more difficult to sustain there, and on it follow more unacceptable things than if one posits that the substance of bread is there;     therefore etc     .

104. The proof of the major is that, from the fact that the faith is given us for salvation, it should be determined and held by the Church in such way as is more suitable for salvation. But by positing such an immoderately difficult understanding, and one on which unacceptable things seem manifestly to follow, occasion is given for turning away from the faith all the philosophers, or rather almost all, who as it were follow natural reason; or at any rate occasion is given for impeding them from converting to the faith, if they are told that such things belong to the faith. Indeed, it seems that a philosopher, or anyone else who follows natural reason, would have a greater difficulty about what is posited here in the denial of the substance of bread than he would have about all the articles we hold about the Incarnation. And it seems a cause for wonder why in the case of one article, which is not a main article of the faith, such an understanding should be so asserted that thereby it lies open to the contempt of all who follow reason.

105. [Third reason] - The third reason is as follows: nothing is to be held as belonging to the substance of the faith save what can be had expressly from the Scriptures, or is expressly declared or expressed by the Church, or evidently follows from what is plainly contained in Scripture or plainly determined by the Church. This major seems sufficient, because for nothing else would anyone have cause to expose himself to death; and he would laudably expose himself to death for everything that is of the substance of the faith; and also it seems a levity to believe firmly what in none of these ways would be held as certain, because there is no sufficient authority or reason if none of these ways is found. Now it does not seem to be expressly obtained in these ways that the substance of bread is not there. For in John 6, where the truth of the Eucharist is much proved, the thing is plain when Christ says, vv.51-52, “I am the living bread; whoever eats of this bread     etc .” and in I Corinthians 10.16 Paul says, “The bread which we break, is it not a communion in the body of Christ?” Nor is there found anywhere that the Church has solemnly declared this truth, nor even how it could be evidently inferred from anything manifestly believed. Therefore      etc.

106. If you say, as one doctor says [Aquinas], that in Matthew 26.26 when Christ says “This is my body” he is insinuating that the bread does not remain, because otherwise that proposition would be false - this argument is not cogent:

Because, given that the bread did remain, the substance of bread would not be pointed to [sc. by ‘this is my body’] but what is contained under the bread would be; just as now the accidents are not pointed to, because then the proposition would be false. But the sense is: ‘this being, contained under this perceptible sign, is my body’.

107. Again, in sacraments of truth there should be no falsity; but the accidents naturally signify the substances which they affect, and if they (that is their substances) were not underneath them, the natural signification of the accidents would be false; so this is unacceptable.

If you say they signify the body and blood of Christ and that this signification is true - on the contrary:

Natural signification does not change because of a signification instituted at pleasure; therefore the accidents signify the same as what they were signifying before; so there would, on this score, be falsity in the natural signification if the things signified were not under the signs. But when one posits that these signified things are underneath the signs, truth in the natural signification of the accidents is secured.

Truth could also be had in signification at pleasure, because the things signified at pleasure by institution could be contained within those substances.

And thus in every way would truth be obtained in the case of each signification; but according to that other way [sc. signification at pleasure] there is falsity in the natural signification; therefore the other way is more appropriate than this one.